Leadoff batters, where are you?

Everybody has their own idea of what a leadoff batter should be. Some think it should be the fast guy who can steal bases. Others like the speed / power combination. Some think that the leadoff batter should be the guy with the best on-base percentage. Some, writing in the past, focus on OPS. I tend to favor one or two of the latter. But if I had to commit myself, my preference would be the guy with the best on-base percentage who is not necessarily the elite hitter on the team.

The elite hitter usually bats third or fourth and the long-standing theory is that the leadoff guy gets on base and the big guys get him home. If they are also speed guys, that's great as long a they can be successful stealing 80% of the time. If they have some pop, that's also great. But the bottom line, for me, is that the first guy in the lineup can get on base at least 35% of the time.

I compiled the league spit total for all of the Major Leagues for the past fifty years. And except for one golden age we will talk about in a minute, the collective of MLB leadoff batters have not been overly more successful of getting on base better than the collective of MLB batters as a whole. See the chart below:

The last four years is the first four-year stretch since the early to mid-1960s where the collective leadoff batters did not average a .330 on-base percentage. The downturn follows the overall downturn in offense over the last four years.

But as you can also see, the current offense is similar to the offense of the mid-1980s but that was also the dawn of a golden age of leadoff batters that lasted until 1995 or so. That was the period of Rickey Henderson, Wade Boggs, Lenny Dykstra, Tim Raines, Brett Butler and even Bip Roberts. All those guys were terrific at getting on base despite whatever the league averages were and dragged the entire category up with them.

The average year for a leadoff batter resulted in an on-base percentage of about 10 points higher than all players as a whole. During those glory years, it often rose as high as 18 points. 

Why is that significant? Some writers have suggested that a good leadoff batter can add as much as 15 runs to his team. Generally, leadoff batters have a thousand plate appearances league-wide more than the number three hitter on the team, or about 33 more plate appearances for each of the thirty teams. 15 runs is a little more than a win. A win is worth $5 to $6 million. A win could also make a difference in the standings.

I have found in my research that unless the collective of leadoff batters have an on-base percentage of .330 or higher, they will not score more collective runs than the number three batters in the league. And that is for a thousand more plate appearances! So, yes, it does make a difference.

As I stated, the last four years, the collective leadoff batters (by the way, I am using baseball-reference.com's league splits) have averaged less than a .330 on-base percentage. This past season (2013), only six leadoff batters--or one-fifth of all teams--had a leadoff guy whose on-base percentage was over .350: Shin-Soo Choo, Matt Carpenter, Norichika Aoki, Jacoby Ellsbury, Ian Kinsler and Jose Reyes.

Is it any surprise that two of those guys were two of the highest paid free agents this off season and another, Kinsler, was part of one of the biggest trades?

As recently as 2009, there were fifteen leadoff batters (I have been using 400 min. plate appearances at the position) whose on-base percentage was over .350. So we went from half of all teams to a fifth. In 2008, there were fourteen. In 2007, there were fourteen. But there have been only six for the past three seasons.

Perhaps the leadoff batter has become a market inefficiency. Or perhaps the trend simply indicates a pitcher dominated era. There also might be a reflection of the acceptance of the strikeout as just another out somewhere in the mix too. Whatever the case, the leadoff batter is not what it used to be even as recently as 2009.

	Lead off
Year	OBP	LG OBP	Difference
1963	0.318	0.309	0.009
1964	0.317	0.313	0.004
1965	0.318	0.311	0.007
1966	0.324	0.310	0.014
1967	0.307	0.306	0.001
1968	0.314	0.299	0.015
1969	0.331	0.320	0.011
1970	0.335	0.326	0.009
1971	0.325	0.317	0.008
1972	0.315	0.311	0.004
1973	0.336	0.325	0.011
1974	0.336	0.324	0.012
1975	0.340	0.327	0.013
1976	0.328	0.320	0.008
1977	0.339	0.323	0.016
1978	0.323	0.330	-0.007
1979	0.342	0.326	0.016
1980	0.348	0.320	0.028
1981	0.330	0.324	0.006
1982	0.329	0.325	0.004
1983	0.343	0.323	0.020
1984	0.333	0.323	0.010
1985	0.333	0.326	0.007
1986	0.333	0.331	0.002
1987	0.349	0.331	0.018
1988	0.336	0.318	0.018
1989	0.332	0.320	0.012
1990	0.345	0.325	0.020
1991	0.343	0.323	0.020
1992	0.342	0.322	0.020
1993	0.350	0.332	0.018
1994	0.349	0.339	0.010
1995	0.350	0.338	0.012
1996	0.350	0.340	0.010
1997	0.347	0.337	0.010
1998	0.347	0.335	0.012
1999	0.349	0.345	0.004
2000	0.349	0.345	0.004
2001	0.331	0.332	-0.001
2002	0.332	0.331	0.001
2003	0.333	0.333	0.000
2004	0.343	0.335	0.008
2005	0.342	0.330	0.012
2006	0.343	0.337	0.006
2007	0.345	0.336	0.009
2008	0.345	0.333	0.012
2009	0.347	0.333	0.014
2010	0.329	0.325	0.004
2011	0.328	0.321	0.007
2012	0.324	0.319	0.005
2013	0.329	0.318	0.011
	0.335	0.326	0.010

A simple NLCS at bat gets complicated

Don Mattingly called it the key of the game. The TBS broadcast team said the same thing. Other news stories called it as such. It was the third inning and Matt Carpenter came to the plate to face Clayton Kershaw with a zero to zero score and one out. To that point, Kershaw had thrown 38 pitches to get the first seven outs. By the time Carpenter hit his double, that count was up to 49. Carpenter would score almost immediately on a Carlos Beltran single. That was the only run the Cardinals needed. The simple explanation would be that Carpenter had a great at bat and won the battle. The opposite would be that Kershaw lost that battle. But things are never that simple. In that single at bat, Carpenter did not just win a battle that Kershaw lost. It gets so much more complicated than that.

The first paragraph presented the traditionalist view of the at bat. Carpenter and Kershaw battled and Carpenter won. There is another school of thinking where the pitcher only has three things in his control: the walk, the strikeout and the home run. Therefore, in this also simple explanation, Kershaw did his job and Carpenter did his job and a batted ball just happened to fall in play. Again, that is too simple an answer. The umpire also affects balls and strikes, the catcher's ability to "frame" the pitch just off the corner and the batter's patience and strike zone awareness also play a part.

There is also another factor we haven't discussed and that is pitch selection. Ultimately, the final say on the pitch to throw is the pitcher's, but the catcher and often times the pitching or dugout coach or manager also have a say on what is thrown.

So as you can see, we have already ratcheted up the complication factor beyond the simple happenings that show up in the box score concerning when Matt Carpenter faced Clayton Kershaw in the third inning.

Let's look at the pitch sequence and also my imperfect recollection of the at bat I watched on the television set. Fortunately, sites like Brooksbaseball.net can help. Here is that site's charts of the proceedings:

I added the pitch sequence numbers to the bottom chart. Just to help us out here, I will type out each pitch with the results as best I remember them:

1. Slider - outside corner. Called a ball. Could have been called either way.
2. Fastball - Center of the plate, mid-thigh. Bad location. Fouled. Carpenter a tad late.
3. Fastball - Middle in, belt high. Bad location. Fouled. Carpenter late again.
4. Fastball - Above the belt, inside. Good location. Fouled. Carpenter late. Great pitch, so a good foul.
5. Curve - Middle away. Bad location. Fouled hard just outside the first base line.
6. Slider - Brooks called it a fastball, but it was at slider speed. Not much movement? Inside and up in the strike zone. Hanger. Fouled.
7. Slider - Low and below the strike zone. Better location. Fouled...barely.
8. Fastball - Belt high and inside. Fouled. Carpenter late.
9. Fastball - Way outside and high. Ball.
10. Fastball - Inside on the black, above the belt. Great pitch. Carpenter hit it foul. Great foul.
11. Slider - Middle in, thigh high. Hit hard for a double. 

That is how the at bat went. Kershaw made some great pitches that Carpenter was great to foul off. Kershaw made some fat pitches that Carpenter also fouled.  The last pitch was ill-advised. I have problems with the pitch selection because Carpenter was behind on a lot of the fastballs. There was only one he seemed to time well. The slower slider helped Carpenter. It was also thrown in a bad location, down and middle in, just where lefty batters love it. Carpenter did and laced it. A curve might have had a greater surprise factor.

A curve might have also been a better call with the ninth pitch while the count was still 1-2. But I think the curve was taken out of the equation because Carpenter reacted well to the first one and hit it well, just missing a double. But part of that equation was a bad location and another curve could have been thrown to a better result.

Otherwise than that, Kershaw and his catcher, A.J. Ellis, could have stayed with fastballs as Carpenter had shown no ability to put good wood on those.

So, you see, a lot happened in that at bat. Kershaw challenged Carpenter in the strike zone. Carpenter could not square up the fastballs. Two of the three sliders were thrown in bad locations with the final one being hammered. The one curve was in a bad location and then abandoned. This was no simple eleven pitches. Kershaw did not get the call on the first pitch, thus giving himself less room with a ball. It was complicated. And yes, I agree that the result of that confrontation was the single biggest factor in why the rest of Kershaw's day did not go very well.

Matt Carpenter should be the NL All-Star second baseman

A high-powered engine is not all that useful without a good starter. And the St. Louis Cardinals are that high-powered engine and the starter is Matt Carpenter. Not only is he getting on base at a .396 pace that allows him to be the third highest run-scorer in baseball, but he has solidified a position that has been a Cardinal weakness for a decade. His consistent on-base skills are added to his strong fielding and base running skills to make him the best second baseman in the National League thus far this season.

The Cardinals have had difficulty finding a guy to play second base for years. It was so bad that Tony LaRussa resorted to bringing Skip Schumaker in from the outfield to play the position for a few years. Here is the position's OPS breakdown since 2004 starting with that season: .695, 703, .701, .667, .754, .746, .671, .712 and last year, .642. This year, the position is at .840. A big reason is Matt Carpenter.

And this does not appear to be a fluke either. At this point in the season, Carpenter has nearly the same number of plate appearances as he had all of last season. In fact, with 338 this year, he is only two plate appearances from last year's total of 340. In those 340 PAs last season, Carpenter walked 34 times. He has walked 34 times this season. In 2012, he had 22 doubles. This season, he has 21. Last year, he had six homers. This year he has six.

But in other areas, he is improved over a year ago. Last year, Matt Carpenter struck out 18.5% of the time. This year, he is only striking out 13.3%. He has always had good plate discipline and this season has only swung at 23.2% of pitches out of the strike zone, similar to last year. But a big difference is that he has always had a low swing and miss rate, but this year has taken it a step further and has only swung and missed 3.7% of the time, tied for sixth best in baseball.

Matt Carpenter has also been a line drive machine. Last year, he hit a lot of line drives, to the tune of 23.8% of his batted balls. This season, he is at an amazing 27.2%. He is fairly ground ball / fly ball neutral and so his high BABIP of .358 seems justified and in line with his .346 BABIP of last year. The thing I especially love about Carpenter is where his batted balls go. He has pulled the ball 58 times. He has hit the ball to center 62 times and he has hit the ball the opposite way 52 times. It is impossible to defense that kind of spray chart. And his batting average of over .360 on each of those directions also tells me that his BABIP is not a fluke and worthy of regression.

While Carpenter is a good base runner, he is not a base steal guy. He only has one. So that is his only small weakness as a lead-off batter. But his on-base skills more than make up for that lack. In other words, he is no Juan Pierre, but then again, he is no Juan Pierre.

The only thing holding Matt Carpenter back from the second base All-Star vote is that the Cardinals still bounce him back and forth a bit between second and third base. He has played 476+ innings at second and 167+ innings at third. That kind of thing is great for Fantasy Baseball players, but sort of takes him away from being considered a true second baseman. But for me, he has been one of the most valuable members of a very good baseball team and he would be my second base pick for the All Star Game.