Sunday, June 07, 2009

Closer Brought in for Games that are Tied

There is this "book" that everyone seems to talk about. This "book" has nuggets such as bunting for a sacrifice when at home but not on the road (or maybe it's the opposite). One of the newest items in the "book" is that you bring in a closer if it's the ninth inning and the score is tied and you are the home team. The same "book" says that you don't bring the closer in a ninth inning tie score situation if you are on the road. Like all items in the "book," these baseball "rules" are based on logic passed down from one manager to the next. But are they always logical and based on accumulated data? Probably not. Let's take a look at the closer pitching the ninth in a tie game entry.


The Fan has watched Mariano Rivera pitch for a long time. One thing this casual observer has always noticed is that he doesn't seem to be the same pitcher in non-save situations. Doing some research, the data proves that casual observation. In save situations, batters facing Rivera have an 88 OPS+ against him. Advantage Mo. But in non-save situations, he becomes rather ordinary and batters have a 106 OPS+. Advantage batter. To take it further. in save situations, Rivera has a 4.58 to 1 strikeout to walk ratio. In non-save situations, that figure is 3.44 to 1. Of course, this observation was exacerbated by Rivera's loss today in a tie game.

If you take Rivera by himself, then the "book" looks like it's messed up. Bringing Rivera in a tie game doesn't seem as effective. But before making that major pronouncement, we better look at more closers than just Rivera. The following lists the batters' OPS+ for several closers in save situations (the first number) and non-save situations (the second number).

Trever Hoffman: 92 - 115
Billy Wagner: 104 - 94
Francisco Rodriguez: 99 - 101
Joe Nathan: 72 - 88
Brad Lidge: 94 - 107
Bobby Jenks: 88 - 115
Troy Percival: 94 - 110
Jonathan Papelbon: 93 - 97
Lee Smith: 98 - 102

The Fan already knows some of this data is corrupt. For example, Rivera, Jenks and Papelbon each had a year of starting before they became relievers. Lidge, Percival and Wagner have always pitched in relief. But considering that most of these pitchers' statistics come from relieving, then that flushes out most of the offending data (at least in this small mind's opinion).

As easily seen from the numbers in the list, at times it pays to listen to that "book" and at times it does not. Papelbon, Nathan and Billy Wagner are good bets in non-save situations. These three come in under 100 in non-save situations meaning they still have the advantage over the hitters. Lee Smith seems like a wash either way as does K-Rod. But all the rest are iffy at best when brought into non-save situations like a tie game in the ninth inning, no matter if their teams are home or on the road. Hoffman, Jenks, Lidge and Percival all give the hitters an advantage in non-save situations.

So what should a manager do then? The manager should study the data and should save pitchers like Rivera, Jenks, Lidge, Hoffman and Percival for save situations. They may prepare differently or have different mental processes for save situations than non-save situations. It may be harder for them to be pumped up. The batters might be in different states of minds facing these closers when save situation occurs and when it doesn't.

The manager should also know that Papelbon, Nathan and Wagner are good bets in such situations. Since all these figures are readily available, then who pitches in tie games can be based on splits for such occasions and not on some ephemeral "book" passed down for generations.

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